The role and duty of corporate directors and officers is in constant flux. A corporate director's duty includes a fiduciary duty, a duty of loyalty and a duty of care, the definition of which changes over time. If the company is sued, corporate directors and officers may be held personally liable for having breached their duty toward the firm's stakeholders so that, before accepting to sit on the board of an organisation, directors ask that their personal wealth be protected through a directors' and officers' liability insurance contract, or D&O insurance. Naturally, riskier companies should be charged a higher premium. In this paper, we examine the higher governance risk associated with income trusts and show that income trusts pay higher D&O insurance premium than common equity firms. This result has wideranging implications for investors insofar as the information provided by D&O insurance coverage provides them with a signal of the firm's governance risk, thus providing a credible alternative to commercial governance indices since it comes from entities (i.e. the insurers) that have a direct financial incentive to assess correctly the governance risk of a corporation, thereby resolving many critics addressed to governance rating agencies. on the board of an organisation, directors ask that their personal wealth be protected through a directors' and officers' liability insurance contract, or D&O insurance. Naturally, riskier companies should be charged a higher premium. In this paper, we examine the higher governance risk associated with income trusts and show that income trusts pay higher D&O insurance premium than common equity firms. This result has wide-ranging implications for investors insofar as the information provided by D&O insurance coverage provides them with a signal of the firm's governance risk, thus providing a credible alternative to commercial governance indices since it comes from entities (i.e. the insurers) that have a direct financial incentive to assess correctly the governance risk of a corporation, thereby resolving many critics addressed to governance rating agencies.
1

Introduction
As representatives of the corporation, directors and officers are responsible for their actions in the corporation as well as the corporation's own actions. As such, a corporate director's duty goes beyond a simple firm value maximizing paradigm to include a fiduciary duty, a duty of loyalty and a duty of care. And if they fail in those duties, the definitions of which are in constant flux, corporate directors and officers become personally liable for damages caused by their actions or absence thereof. According to the different annual surveys conducted by Tillinghast Towers-Perrin 1 (1999 through 2006) , around 20% of firms had at least one lawsuit brought against their directors in the previous ten years, and about 50% of claims made against public companies arise from shareholders. This exposure to liability risk prompts directors and officers to request insurance coverage to protect their personal wealth in case a lawsuit is brought against them as representatives of the corporation. This insurance, which is known as directors' and officers' liability insurance (hereinafter D&O insurance), is extremely common in public corporations.
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Corporate governance and its impact on the risk and return of corporations have been increasingly under the scrutiny of investors. Many governance indices have emerged in order to fulfil the need for governance risk assessment, but these indices are themselves criticized by academics and practitioners. As underlined in Rose (2007), Bhagat et al. (2007) and Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) governance indices suffer from many different methodological shortcomings (see , for a recent survey of governance indices). A growing voice in financial markets strongly urges for accountability from entities emitting ratings (mostly in the debt-rating arena) that are widely used by major market players. An alternative to using ad hoc corporate governance indices is to use the revealed preferences of corporations that have themselves indirectly obtained a corporate governance assessment when they purchased liability insurance on behalf of their directors and officers.
Indeed, because of their direct financial involvement in paying for claims arising against 1 The Tillinghast Towers-Perrin surveys report trends in average D&O claims and premiums as well as patterns in insurance purchasing habits for North American firms. Although these surveys are no free from selection biases, there is no other consistent information on D&O insurance data. 2 According to different Tillinghast Towers-Perrin surveys, approximately 95% of public corporations in the U.S. and 75% of public corporations in Canada provide such insurance to their directors and officers.
directors and officers, insurers have had to develop appropriate technologies that transform a policyholder's observable characteristics into risk measures which yield an appropriate insurance premium. This is true for any type of coverage, including D&O insurance coverage.
As a result, insurance companies that provide liability insurance protection to corporate directors and officers face a strong monetary incentive to correctly measure the risk of litigation. To assess this risk, insurers conduct a thorough investigation of the risk faced by firms seeking an insurance policy for their directors and officers
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. The outcome of this analysis is integrated in the insurance contract.
As litigation against as firm's directors and officers is one of the unfortunate consequences of governance risk, and since the insurer underwriting the contract has the appropriate incentives to measure correctly the potential cost of litigation against the insured firm's directors and officers, one can thus imagine that the structure of a D&O insurance contract is an unbiased measure of a firm's governance risk. Indeed, Baker and Griffith (2007) mention that the main risk directors and officers face is associated with shareholder litigation risk and the major liability exposure is securities litigation on the basis of misrepresentation. We therefore expect D&O insurance premiums to be closely linked to the firm's litigation risk, at least inasmuch as the insurer that provides such protection is using the correct technology to transform observable characteristics into an insurance premium.
The insurance contract therefore provides information on the firm's financial perspectives, the quality of its management team and its "deep governance" features.
To test the prediction that insurers are able to measure litigation risk against a corporation's directors and officers, we would like to gain access to a large database of firm characteristics and control for all that is observable by the insurer, including litigation risk. Unfortunately, D&O insurance characteristics are not available publicly for U.S. firms. A close proxy to U.S.
firms is to use Canadian data as in Core (1997 Core ( , 2000 , and Boyer (2006) . The use of Canadian data is motivated by the fact that companies whose shares are traded on the Toronto stock exchange have to disclose the D&O insurance protection it provides to its managers.
But this still leaves open part of the problem associated with whether insurers are able to measure litigation risk. To control for this problem as much as possible, we decided to limit 3 our dataset to Canadian companies that went public 4 through an initial public offering (IPO) before 2006 and to see if the chosen corporate structure had an impact on the price of D&O insurance. Indeed, until 2006 Canadian companies that decided to go public had the possibility of choosing between two corporate structures: Common equity (or stock) or Income trust. Income trusts are similar to the master limited partnerships that were popular in the early eighties in the United States, but that are no longer of much use.
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The general understanding in the corporate law literature 6 is that income trusts are riskier than stock companies because of their higher risk of cash flow misappropriation and the lack of jurisprudence regarding their directors' and officers' duties. As a result, income trusts have an inherently more complex governance structure and legal framework than stock companies, which should make them riskier in the eyes of insurance companies. Studying the impact of an organizational form on the D&O insurance contract at the time of the IPO allows us to assess the extent to which insurers assess the income trusts' litigation risk. If they are indeed riskier, then, ceteris paribus, income trust should pay more for the same D&O insurance protection. Of the 272 companies identified in Huson and Pazzaglia (2007) that went public in Canada between 1995 and 2005, 128 organized as common equity corporations, while 144 chose to become income trusts. This controlled lab experiment allows us to test whether D&O insurance premiums vary between common equity and income trust companies.
In line with the corporate risk hypothesis we develop, our results show that corporations incorporated under an income trust structure pay higher D&O insurance premiums than firms incorporated under a common equity structure. Figure 1 highlights our main results:
Income trusts pay higher premiums than common equity companies for a given coverage.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] This higher premium remains significant even after controlling for many firms aspects that have been hypothesized in the literature to have an impact on D&O insurance. As a 4 Chalmers et al. (2002) also analysed the demand for D&O insurance using proprietary data from 72 American firms that went public through an IPO between 1992 and 1996. 5 For more details, see Ciccotello and Muscarella (1997) . 6 See Halpern (2004) , Gillen (2005 Gillen ( , 2006 , Zetzsche (2005) , Huson and Pazzaglia (2007) and Boyer et al. (2009) consequence, insurance companies see income trusts as being riskier than common equity companies, which implies that D&O insurance contracts reveal some litigation and governance risk information to the market.
Our main result provides strong support for the suggestion made by Griffith (2006), Baker and Griffith (2007) and Chalmers et al. (2002) , that D&O insurance contracts provide valuable information to investors inasmuch as insurers are correctly pricing a company's litigation and governance risk. Our result also has the utmost implication that insurers are able to assess governance risk, a risk that is revealed to investors through the premium. And because insurers have a direct financial incentive to use an optimal technology to assess a firm's governance risk, the signal they provide to the market regarding a firm's governance risk is relatively clean.
The remainder of the paper goes as follows. After a short primer on directors and officers insurance and on income trusts in sections 2 and 3, we develop our hypothesis and describe the data in Section 4. We then analyse our results in section 5, present robustness tests in section 6 and conclude with a discussion in section 7.
A primer on directors' and officers' insurance
The D&O insurance market
Directors' and officers' liability insurance contracts cover corporate directors and officers against claims arising from their activities as representatives of the corporation. Divergence in interests mixed with asymmetric information between managers, including both directors and officers, and shareholders is the main source of conflicts. The insurance company will reimburse the corporation and/or its managers for the costs of settling and defending the lawsuit up to the policy limit, provided that the firm's directors and officers have acted honestly and in good faith. In theory, should managers and their company have acted in a fraudulent manner the insurance company could choose not to honour the policy. In practice however, the cost to check and prove a bad faith error typically prompts insurers to settle claims before trial. The average settlement was over 33 million dollars for 2007 whereas, according to Baker and Griffith (2007) A D&O insurance policy is usually comprised of three distinct types of coverage. Side A coverage is increasingly popular and has become the focus of directors and officers, as it covers them whenever their corporation is unable or unwilling to indemnify them. Typically, no deductible applies to individual managers. Side A coverage is usually purchased by a corporation to attract competent outside directors. It can also be noted that Side A coverage can be used in order to alleviate the underinvestment problem put forth by Jensen (1976) .
Side B coverage reimburses the corporation whenever it indemnified its managers following a lawsuit brought upon them as representative of the corporation, whereas Side C pays for claims made against the company itself, typically concerning securities claims. Hence, Side B
and Side C cover the corporation rather than its directors and officers thereby epitomizing agency costs, as mentioned by Griffith (2006) . Unfortunately, no detail on the different types of coverage purchased is provided. The 2006 Tillinghast Towers-Perrin survey mentions that 38% of public companies purchased a Side A only coverage, and that this figure is on the rise.
Directors and officers are increasingly aware of the risks they face when they take on the position.
The D&O insurance market, as any insurance market, is subject to cycles which translate into premium and policy limit fluctuations. A hard market is characterized by reduced capacity and fewer insurers who offer higher premiums and lower limits, with insurance contracts containing more stringent restrictions. It is mainly the competitive pressure within the market that drives the D&O insurance cycles. and requires a full array of documentation, the analysis of public financial and accounting data, and interviews with the prospective insured's senior management team. The information 8 gathered from these three sources is thoroughly detailed since any claim contradicting the veracity of the statements supplied by the client in the risk assessment phase might trigger the insurance policy to be revoked or the claim denied. This binding mechanism allows us to hypothesize that once the insurance contract is signed, no residual asymmetric information remains between the underwriter and the insured, which corroborates Knepper and Bailey (1998) .
Underwriters must assess accurately the litigation risk of each policyholder since they ultimately bear the full cost of their mistakes. Hence, they are bound to exert extreme caution before underwriting a risk. Because of their strong monetary incentives to correctly assess a policyholder's risk, Baker and Griffith (2007) argue that underwriters have specific tools that allow them to succeed in this task since they are provided with private information internal to the firm that is not divulged to other market participants.
A preliminary litigation risk measure is established based on the firm's financial information such as the insured firm's industry perspectives, its market capitalization and volatility.
Governance factors are then taken into account. Baker and Griffith (2007) divide the analysis of governance characteristics into two categories: Culture and Character. Culture refers to the stringency of internal controls at work within the corporation and how top management complies with formal and informal norms in addition to the incentive structure in place.
Beyond traditional governance checkpoints, underwriters investigate the way the company is run to get a sense of "how information flows throughout the firm" in order to detect the source of potential D&O litigation. The second category is Character. It aims to identify excessive risk-taking attitudes by directors and officers and their propensity to hold themselves above the law. In essence, Character boils down to uncovering the managers' sense of ethics.
The empirical determinants of D&O insurance premiums
Following the Dey Report, disclosure of basic information regarding D&O insurance (i.e., policy limit, premium and deductible) in the firms' annual proxy statements has become mandatory in Canada 9 since 1993. This allowed a handful of academics to analyse the determinants of the purchase of D&O insurance as well as the factors affecting the premiums. The first to test prediction on D&O insurance with Canadian data was Core (1997) using a dataset of 222 firms whose fiscal year ended in 1994. He demonstrates that litigation risk and the cost of financial distress are the main determinants positively affecting the likelihood of D&O insurance purchase as well as the policy limit and deductible and rejects the hypothesis that D&O insurance is part of the compensation package for managers. Later Core (2000) notes that the premium charged is the product of the probability of being sued and the expected cost of settlement and is explained by the governance structure quality as well as the business risk of a firm. The quality of a firm's governance structure is measured by ownership structure, board independence and management entrenchment variables. He finds that the premium charged by insurers reflects the quality of governance so that weak governance is statistically related to positive excess CEO compensation, which has previously been associated with lower value for shareholders (see Core, Holtausen and Larcker, 1999) . Bhagat, Brickley and Coles (1987) disagree with the view that D&O insurance coverage reduces liability and leads to less disciplined managers. Using an event study with a sample of 112 American firms, they find that the decision to purchase D&O insurance does not reduce shareholder wealth, but might in fact even have a positive impact. In addition, some authors emphasize the monitoring role of D&O insurers, a role that shareholders should value, especially shareholders of large widely-held firms.
8 Holderness (1990) notes that liability insurance can be used by a company to attract outside directors, which in itself is theoretically a good monitoring device according to Fama and Jensen (1983) . Moreover, an insurer can also veto opportunistic changes in the governance structure, thereby protecting the shareholders' interests. Holderness also notes that liability insurance promotes internal monitoring as directors will be keen to monitor each other since should one hide or alter information, coverage might be denied for all. As a result, purchasing D&O insurance comes with the service of an external independent investigation of its governance practice. Consequently, companies where ownership and control are clearly separated should particularly value this service and consequently purchase more insurance. O'Sullivan (1997) successfully tested Holderness ' (1990) hypothesis using a sample of 366 British public firms. He concludes that D&O insurance acts as a substitute for inside ownership as a governance mechanism.
Using proprietary data on 72 American IPO firms between 1992 and 1996, Chalmers et al. (2002) examine the relationship between IPO underpricing and D&O insurance coverage and find that firms with more coverage at the time of the IPO are more likely to be sued for mispricing. They also find that insurers are able to price this opportunism ex-ante by charging higher premiums prior to the IPO to companies whose post-IPO performance will be poor. This result suggests that managers purchase D&O to protect themselves when they know the IPO price was high, which is in line with the managerial opportunism hypothesis that sees D&O insurance as detrimental for shareholders. Moreover, it sheds light on the insurers' ability to forecast potential litigation arising from poor post-IPO performance.
Other authors follow a different line of reasoning and assert that D&O insurance protects shareholders rather than managers. For example, Boyer (2005) concludes that minority shareholders welcome D&O insurance protection because it ultimately protects their wealth against managerial incompetence since it is mainly shareholders who sue managers under D&O policies. This conclusion falls in line with Guttiérrez (2003) who, using a theoretical model, reaches the conclusion that D&O insurance allows shareholders to optimize litigation as a monitoring tool for managerial ineptitude.
Our study focuses on the income trust structure to test our hypothesis that insurers translate their assessment of governance risk into the premium to be charged. We therefore present in the following section the specificities of this organizational structure.
3.
A primer on income trusts 3.1. The structure of income trusts
Income trusts are investment vehicles structured to maximize the periodic cash distribution to unitholders. Trusts sell units to investors and invest the proceeds to purchase debt and equity of the underlying business. As a result, a unit is a package of debt and equity of the operating entity. Unitholders receive virtually all net earnings from the operating business. 
Income trusts and governance
Even before the Canadian federal government decided to remove the income trusts' tax benefits, many analysts (see Halpern, 2004, and Gillen, 2006) criticized the unfounded overvaluation of income trusts. Expressing his opinion regarding the governance of income trusts, the vice-president of public equities at the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan said: "There are basically no rules, it's like the Wild West"
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. Whereas finance theory tells us that free cash flow should be distributed to investors to frustrate spendthrift managers (Jensen, 1986) , Zetzsche (2005) doubts that managers will ultimately be entirely constrained. Indeed, they are under no obligation to distribute anything. Moreover, even though Halpern (2004) contends that income trusts reduce the likelihood of financial distress since debt and equity are bundled together into the unit, most income trusts still use third-party debt financing.
And since King (2003) observes that third-party debt is usually senior to unit-debt, income trusts are not immune to incurring financial distress costs should financial difficulties arise. Gillen (2005 Gillen ( , 2006 analyses in detail the two structures, scrutinizing corporate governance features. He finds that whereas the declaration of trust relatively closely mirrors corporation statutes, some important facets of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) are not replicated in trust law, to the disadvantage of investors. The most significant of which are the absence of shareholder proposals, appraisal remedy and oppression remedy. This prompted Boyer et al. (2009) to conclude that income trust law has not originally been created to suit a running business structure and thus does not emphasize investor protection as much as common equity corporate law does.
As mentioned in Boyer et al. (2009) , although unitholders do not have access to derivative actions, they can still be claimants against trustees who breached their fiduciary duties.
Indeed, trustees owe their duties to unitholders who are beneficiaries and not to the trust because the latter is not a separate legal entity under Canada's common law. Moreover, unitholders might even be able to bring a derivative action against the operating entity insofar as they can persuade courts that the value of their units is inherently tied to the actions of the operating business. Therefore, since unitholders have de facto the possibility to take legal action against trustees, underwriters establishing an insurance contract for an income trust should exert at least as much caution in examining the governance structure of their prospective client as they do for a traditional public corporation.
The value of investment of both types of investors is intrinsically related to the performance of the company. To understand why the control of unitholders is indirect at best, one needs to have in mind the way a trust is run. As King (2003) notes, "the first key difference is the introduction of one or more legal entities between equity investors and the operating company". As a result, unitholders are one step further than common equity holders from the reins of the operating company.
The income trust structure in Figure 2 represents the most basic structure of an income trust. The complexity of the structure can grow rapidly as more legal entities come into play.
It is uncertain whether investors fully appreciate this complexity and weigh the pros and cons to integrate it in the valuation process. This problem is particularly acute since the bulk of investors in income trusts are individual.
In addition, conflicts of interest may arise when trustees are directors and managers of the operating company, a situation that happens to be quite common. It is not clear that they will always have the best interest of unitholders in mind when taking decisions. Additional conflicts emerge when trustees delegate their responsibilities to external management teams (Gillen, 2006) . These outside managers may lack the necessary incentives, skills and time to perform for the betterment of unitholders. The Globe and Mail reports that "22% of the country's largest trusts continue to be managed under external contracts, which means they do not have in-house management teams who report directly to the board. A further 7% have a combination of internal management and an external management contract." 
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Income trusts also have discretion over their governance structure. There is no specified standard structure, which complicates the evaluation process for investors and Business trusts that adopted the trust structure without fitting the traditional income trust criteria are particularly concerned.
Thus, income trusts are much more complex entities and operate in a more opaque framework than traditional public companies. Unitholders do not enjoy as much protection as investors, although they are able to litigate. Moreover, the governance structure of income trusts is not standardized and various sources of conflicts of interest exist that do not apply for public corporations.
The IPO of ITs
The decision to become an income trust rather than a common equity firm depends on many factors. Huson and Pazzaglia (2007) show that the choice of going public as an income trust rather than as a common equity corporation depends heavily on the relative market valuation of each organizational structure. The authors develop two hypotheses as reasons why a company might choose to become an income trust. The first refers to asset-based characteristics, with maturity and profitability dictating the likelihood to become a trust, whereas the second involves external factors, namely the relative valuation of income trusts compared to common equity corporations. They find that after controlling for the asset base, higher market valuations for income trusts significantly increases the probability that a company will choose the trust structure over the traditional one when going public.
Furthermore, market timers enjoy lower underwriting fees as well as lower underpricing, even though they ultimately pay the price in the long term through poor stock price performance.
Hence, companies might choose to go public as income trusts on the ground of market timing rather than sound strategic judgment. The poor long term performance of such players might trigger claims. Consequently, we argue that insurers should have paid particularly attention to the pricing of coverage of income trust IPOs in our sample firms.
Hypothesis development, data and variables description
Hypothesis and data
With these fundamental differences between income trusts and common equity companies in mind, we now develop our hypothesis. The end goal of our paper is to determine whether liability insurance companies believe that the managers of the corporations that choose the income trust corporate structure face a higher risk of litigation. Underpinning this question is our assertion that insurers use a plethora of information that is not available to the public and that this information is reflected in the pricing of the D&O insurance contract.
Since income trusts have a more complex governance structure and since Baker and Griffith (2007) find that what matters most to underwriters is the firms' governance structure and culture, income trusts should pay more for coverage, ceteris paribus. A necessary condition for this statement to be valid is that insurers are able to efficiently price governance risk. The risk assessment conducted by insurers (see Blades, 2006) with the possible denial of coverage should an information have been omitted or distorted, prompts us to believe that there is no residual information asymmetry. Hence, our null hypothesis is that the D&O insurance premium is not affected by whether the insured is a stock company or an income trust. The alternative hypothesis is that insurers require a higher premium from income trusts, as they acknowledge that their governance structure is inherently more susceptible to give rise to a claim.
To test our hypothesis, we gathered information from proxy statements. The initial sample of 272 firms comes from the aforementioned Huson and Pazzaglia (2007) 
Description of variables
The determinants of premium previously found in the literature encompass variables related to the financial situation of the firm as well as the composition of its board of directors. We describe the variables used in this paper below.
Dependent variables
Purchase is an indicator variable with value one if the firm purchased D&O insurance (as mentioned in the proxy statement) and zero otherwise. As firms are required to divulge whether their directors and officers were covered by a D&O insurance policy, a firm whose management proxy statement makes no mention of D&O insurance was deemed to provide no such coverage to its directors and officers.
We test for the price of coverage using the log of the ratio of premium on coverage (ln_prem_cov). This ratio gives us the unit price of D&O insurance, which is also known as the "rate-on-line" in the language of insurance underwriters. Presumably, a firm that pays a higher rate-on-line is perceived by the insurer as being more at risk to be sued since it is paying more per unit of coverage.
Independent variables
The main variable of interest in our study is the ITCE variable, which is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is an income trust and zero otherwise. The null hypothesis is that this variable is insignificant in explaining the price of coverage. If income trusts are a riskier organisational form in terms of governance, then we should expect the ITCE variable to have a positive and significant impact on ln_prem_cov.
Financial variables
Ln_MVE is the logarithm of the market value of our sample firms. The potential damage should litigation occur is higher for large companies as more equity is at risk, and we could therefore expect larger firms to pay a higher premium. On the other hand, larger firms are more likely to have in house legal staff to defend against litigation brought against a firm's directors and officers. This means that larger corporations could have a lesser need for D&O insurance. We collected this variable with Compustat and completed the missing data with the market price times the number of shares outstanding as of the end of the firm first fiscal year after its IPO. We measure the performance of our sample firms by computing their return on assets (ROA). Two confronting views can be put forth to anticipate the sign of the coefficient in our regression. On one hand we could expect better performing firms to face less litigation arising from shareholders who typically sue because of financial loss. On the other hand, a high ROA might be due to earnings management for example or might simply imply that future performance might be lower and possibly trigger claims, in which case we would expect a positive relationship between ROA and the price of coverage.
Debt_ratio is equal to Assets Total Debt
Total
. The more levered a firm is, the higher its probability of distress and its need for insurance. The risk is therefore higher in the eye of the underwriter who will demand a higher premium accordingly. In contrast, the monitoring hypothesis put forth by Holderness (1990) implies a negative relationship as external debt holders have incentives to monitor the firm, which lessens the need for the monitoring services provided by the insurance company. Consequently, the expected sign of Debt_ratio is ambiguous.
Governance variables
We collected several variables related to governance: board independence, CEO and chairman of the board duality, board size and the presence of a blockholder. However, we contend that of those, only board independence is a true indicator of the governance structure of a firm. Consequently, and in order to satisfy the requirements of the selected econometric model, we include all four variables as independent variables in our regressions with Purchase as the dependent variable and keep board independence as the only governance measure in our regressions with the log of the rate-on-line as the dependent variable.
Board_Indep is the percentage of unrelated directors on the board of directors as mentioned in the firms' proxy statements. We expect firms with more independent boards to pay a lower premium as a large part of the literature views independent boards as a good governance feature.
Duality is an indicator variable taking on the value one if the chairman of the board is also the chief executive officer of the company and zero otherwise. This particular feature of a board is usually viewed as an entrenchment red flag. The entrenchment hypothesis would therefore dictate that Duality be positively correlated with Purchase.
Board_size refers to the number of directors on the board. As more directors sit on the board, the likelihood that they will demand D&O insurance increases.
Blockholder is an indicator variable equal to one if a shareholder owns 10% of more of the voting shares, as mentioned in the firms' proxy statements. Again, two lines of reasoning can be confronted. Boyer (2005) hypothesized that blockholders view D&O insurance as a wealth protecting mechanism; we thus expect a positive sign for the relationship between
Blockholder and Purchase. On the other hand, D&O insurance can be considered as a substitute monitoring mechanism as in O'Sullivan (1993), thereby indicating a negative expected sign.
Other variables
Float is the ratio of the number of shares issued at the IPO on the total number of shares outstanding after the IPO. As a larger fraction of shares is issued at the time of the IPO, we expect that the probability of litigation and the expected loss should a claim arise both increase.
Pct_US_Sales is the percentage of the firm's sales that were incurred in the United States.
The variable was collected by looking at annual reports for the year following the IPO. The
United States being a more fertile environment for potential litigation, we expect this variable to be positively correlated with the decision to purchase D&O insurance.
Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm belongs to one of the risky industries identified in Bajaj et al. (2000) . The authors test for settlement statistics across industries and identify the ten riskiest industries (using the first two-digit SIC codes) in terms of number of cases settled as well as the average settlement amount. We argue that an insurer will deem a prospective insured firm to pose a greater risk of a lawsuit if it belongs to one of these ten risky industries and will charge a higher premium accordingly.
From Table I , we see that our sample is relatively homogeneously distributed across industries. About one third of our sample firms are categorized as belonging to a risky industry. More specifically, 23% of common equity companies operate in risky industries compared to 13.5% of income trusts.
[INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE] First_yr_XS_return is the one year buy-and-hold return of the firm right after its IPO minus the buy-and-hold return on the S&P/TSX for that period. If insurers are able to charge a higher premium to firms which they anticipate will perform poorly, then the relationship between First_yr_XS_return and ln_prem_cov will be negative. We collected the issue prices of our sample firms through their prospectus in SEDAR and checked with the FPInfomart database. Subsequent price information comes from Bloomberg.
First_day_return is the first day return of our sample IPO firms. This variable allows us to control for the underpricing of the IPO in our regressions as suggested by Ritter (1987) .
Following previous IPO literature, we use the aftermarket daily return volatility as a measure of risk. We calculated Volatility as the standard deviation of annualized daily returns. We expect income trust IPOs to experience less post-IPO volatility since they are typically more mature companies with more stable cash flows.
Age is a variable collected from the offering prospectus to account for the number of years since the start of operations of the company at the time of the IPO announcement. For income trusts, we considered the date of inception of the operating company, or in the case of a Real Estate Investment Trust, the start of operations of the current owner of the initial properties. In some cases, there were multiple owners or several companies which were grouped as part of the IPO transaction. Subjective judgment was therefore inevitable in those particular cases but we were wary to focus on the date when the company generating the cash flows started its business. We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient in our regression of the rate-on-line since insurers should more view experience as a positive signal when they assess the risk of an IPO firm because, for instance, more financial data is available.
Finally, we use indicator variables for the different years in our sample to account for the differences in market characteristics and other macroeconomic factors driving premiums.
More specifically, we create an indicator variable Dummy_hard for hard insurance market years. We define hard market years based on the information on premium trends in the 
Econometric model
We first analyse the determinants of the decision to purchase D&O insurance using a probit regression. In our model, this decision depends on business risk factors as well as governance indicators and control variables. A correlation matrix of the variables used is provided in Appendix A.
In order to test whether the pricing of coverage depends on the decision to go public as an income trust or as a common equity corporation, we have to note that the decision to purchase D&O liability insurance is a truncated variable. We therefore proceed in two steps, as put forth by Heckman (1979) in order to avoid potential selection bias. The first step consists of a probit regression to analyse the determinants of the probability that a firm purchases D&O insurance around its IPO date. The dependent variable in this regression is
Purchase. The second step in the Heckman two-step procedure involves an OLS regression to determine what explain log of the rate-on-line (ln erage premium cov ). Of course, because of the selection bias associated with the choice of having D&O insurance or not, we include in the second stage regression the inverse Mills ratio that controls for such a selection bias. Income trusts appear to be more mature companies as they display lower growth. This is consistent with the income trust literature which highlights that the trust structure best fits low growth corporations. Income trusts also show higher performance as measures by their return on assets as well as a higher leverage. In fact, the average common equity firm in our sample is barely profitable at the time of its IPO, and it is twice less leveraged than the average income trust IPO. Although common equity firms appear to have a large market capitalization, the difference is not statistically significant.
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Analysis of results
Descriptive statistics
Examining governance variables, we find that income trusts do not have as many blockholders as common equity firms, and that their boards are significantly smaller and more independent. This last feature is rather surprising. As noted earlier, the boards of income trusts are often controlled by the operating company. However, the proxy statements of income trusts were usually not as clear as those of common equity firms in displaying the independence of their trust members. It is thus possible that a bias was introduced in constructing the Board_indep variable.
The same is true for the Duality variable. An income trust does not run any business but merely holds units and acts as a flow-through entity. Therefore, there is no CEO per se in an income trust, and the duality variable can thus be ambiguous. Theoretically, it should be equal to one for an income trust if the CEO of the operating company acts as the chairman of the board of trustees. This is the logical counterpart of the duality variable for traditional corporations. It is not clear, however, that income trusts are required to report such a duality in their proxy statements. This might have led us to infer that the duality variable for some income trusts was zero when the reality should have dictated the opposite.
There are marked differences in the D&O insurance patterns of the two organisational structures. Common equity firms are more likely to carry D&O insurance than income trusts as shown by the Purchase variable. Income trusts pay a higher premium, however. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level, and is economically significant as well.
The median premium for an income trust (126,873$) is over twice as large as that for a common equity firm (62,152$). Moreover, while the average common equity firm pays 6.15$ for every 1,000$ of D&O insurance coverage, an income trust will pay about 8.42$. This difference is statistically significant at the 5% level.
It is worth mentioning that the two types of firm do not differ in the amount of coverage they purchase. Again, although we have no a priori reason to believe that income trusts should purchase more or less insurance coverage than common equity firms, we do have an a priori reason to expect income trusts to pay a higher price per unit of coverage for D&O insurance. Figure 1 that we introduced earlier in the paper shows that income trusts pay a higher premium for the same amount of coverage. Moreover, the stickiness feature of D&O insurance previously mentioned is also clearly apparent, particularly in Panel C of Figure 1 . Table II also informs us that the average common equity firm in our sample is more likely to operate in a risky industry, which again seems to be in line with the more mature, stable business characteristic of income trusts. Concerning the IPO variables, income trust IPOs represent a larger fraction of the company, but there is no statistical significant difference in the underpricing of income trusts and common equity companies, although income trusts seem to underprice less on average. The one year stock performance statistics show that common equity firms perform better in the year following the IPO, although the difference in not statistically significant. The annualized daily stock price volatility over the same period is much higher for common equity firms, which corroborates the fact that income trusts generate more stable cash flows. Finally, the average number of years since inception is 35 years for income trusts and 19 years for common equity firm IPOs.
Panel B of
Overall, the descriptive statistics presented in Table II are consistent with the general understanding of income trusts: They are mature profitable businesses operating in a less turbulent environment, generating stable cash flows. Nevertheless, we observe that insurers seem to require a higher premium to insure them against shareholder litigation.
Likelihood of carrying D&O insurance
The main statistical relation we are interested in is provided by our probit model regression of Purchase, a dummy variable equal to one if the firm had D&O insurance around its IPO, against ITCE, dummy variable equal to one if the firm is an income trust and zero otherwise.
We also include financial variables, governance measures as well as control variables to test for the determinants of the decision to purchase D&O insurance. Model specification 3 reports that growth firms are more likely to purchase insurance, which is in line with our hypothesis. A marginal change in Growth from the average of 2.34 is associated with a 9.72% increase in the likelihood to purchase insurance, when all variables are set at their means. The size of a firm is inversely related to its likelihood to purchase insurance. This result, even though surprising at first, can be explained by the array of alternatives large companies have at hand in protecting their directors and officers. The
Debt_ratio does not play a significant role in the model, but the profitability measure does.
The return on assets has a positive impact on the decision to purchase insurance. The last significant variable in our probit regressions is the size of the board. A marginal increase in the number of board members from the average of 7 is associated with a 5.73% increase in the likelihood to purchase insurance. The presence of blockholders, board independence and whether the CEO is also the chairman do not seem to affect the insurance purchase decision of the companies in our sample. On the other hand, there is significant evidence that the higher the percentage of sales conducted in the United States, the higher the probability of carrying D&O insurance, which illustrates the United States' more litigious environment (see Clarkson and Simunic, 1994) . The aftermarket volatility, the riskiness of the industry and the number of years from inception to IPO do not seem to impact the likelihood to purchase insurance. We use model specification 3 as the first step in the twostep Heckman procedure that follows.
The pricing of coverage
We now investigate the determinants of the premium charged to firms once they decided to purchase D&O insurance. We are interested in what matters to insurers when the time comes to decide how much to charge for coverage. We report our results from the second stage of the Heckman selection model using the log of the rate-on-line as the dependent variable in Table IV . 13 The independent variables are the ITCE variable, our proxies for the business risk and the governance quality as well as control variables. We exclude three variables which appear in the selection equations from the outcome equations: Blockholder, Board size and Duality.
The main variable of interest for this paper is the ITCE indicator variable. We investigate whether insurers are more suspicious of income trusts due to their governance features and require higher premiums accordingly. The empirical results strongly support our hypothesis.
In every model specification, the coefficient of the ITCE variable remains positive and significant in determining the premium. The results presented in Table IV are robust to various specifications of the selection model.
[INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE]
This result is significant at the 1% level in model specification 6 and shows that the organizational structure plays a meaningful role in the risk assessment conducted by the insurer.
As ITCE enters both the selection and outcome equations in the Heckman procedure, we need to compute the adjusted coefficient in order to interpret its economic significance. We also ran model specification 3 with the rate-on-line as the dependent variable rather than the log of the rate-on-line (results not shown). The adjusted coefficient for ITCE for this econometric specification is 3.27$. Therefore, everything else being equal, if a firm opts for the income trust structure instead of the common equity structure, the insurer will charge 3.27$ more for each 1,000$ of coverage. The average amount of coverage purchased by our sample firms is 24 million dollars, thereby indicating that an income trust should expect to pay 78,000$ more in D&O insurance premium on average than a comparable common equity firm. Assuming that this extra premium remains constant over time and assuming a constant interest rate of 5%, the value of an income trust is 1.5 million dollars less on average than a common equity firm. This extra cost of being an income trust, may be associated with the governance characteristics of income trusts that are somewhat ambiguous and opaque, particularly when it comes to the unknown level of protection that unitholders enjoy compared to that of shareholders, even though unitholders are allowed bring a claim against the income trust's managers if they feel they were wronged. Baker and Griffith (2007) document that insurers are interested in the business risk as well as governance risk while assessing the probability and severity of a potential claim. In particular, insurers seek to uncover "deep governance" effects, beyond observable, traditionally checked governance features. Income trusts represent a rare opportunity to test such a hypothesis, and our results suggest that, at least from the perspective of D&O insurers, the cost associated with the income trusts' byzantine organizational structure and governance risk is significant.
Our study also provides another result in support of Chalmers et al. (2002) . We find that there is a strong negative relationship between the first year excess return and the log of the rate-on-line. Firms that perform poorly the year following their IPO as measured by their stock price performance are strongly penalized by insurers. This result highlights the fact that a drop in the stock market price is an important indicator of a future potential claim. In Chalmers et al. (2002) , the firms' long term performance post IPO is significantly negatively correlated with the D&O premium paid, thereby suggesting that insurers have the ability to forecast performance and price coverage accordingly. And even though we did not have access to the D&O insurance information as of the IPO date since we collected the D&O insurance information in the proxy statement following the end of the first fiscal year of the firm as a public company, it is plausible to assume that the insurer did not have had an entire year of stock price data at hand to assess the riskiness of the prospective insured. Our results therefore concur with those of Chalmers et al. (2002) and suggest that insurers are able to use the private information they gather through the evaluation process to decide the premium to be paid.
The estimates from Table IV also illustrate a close connection between the aftermarket volatility of the firm's stock price and the price of coverage. Moreover, although common equity firms display significant higher volatility than income trusts, and volatility is strongly penalized by insurers, income trusts still pay more for coverage.
Robustness checks
This section reports the results of a series of robustness checks testing for the sensitivity of the empirical results to various model specifications.
Rate-on-line as the dependent variable
As mentioned in the previous section, we also ran the regressions with the rate-on-line as the dependent variable in the second stage of the Heckman procedure to interpret results in dollar terms. The results are qualitatively unchanged (not shown).
Deductible
We included the deductible as an independent variable in both the log and level regressions.
It is interesting to mention that although its coefficient is never significant, introducing the deductible in the regressions has the effect of making the coefficient estimate of the independence of the board variable very small thereby offsetting its significance (not shown). It might look surprising that the independence of the board of directors is positively correlated with the price of coverage. Indeed, a large body of the finance literature views independence as a sign of good governance. However, because we can assume that more independent boards require less stringent conditions and lower deductibles as part of the insurance contract (which translates into higher premiums), it is reasonable to find a positive coefficient, whose significance goes away when we introduce the deductible into the regression.
Natural logarithm of coverage as an independent variable
We also ran the regressions with the logarithm of coverage on the right-hand side of the equation. This specification left the qualitative empirical results unchanged (not shown).
Endogeneity
One can argue that an endogeneity problem likely arises as the residuals of the selection equation might be correlated with the ITCE decision. Indeed, some unobservable factors related to managers might concurrently affect these two decisions that managers take around the IPO date: whether to become a common equity firm or an income trust and whether or not to purchase D&O insurance. If managers are strongly risk averse for example, it might prompt them to opt for a particular organisational structure (the main hypothesis developed in this article would infer that they will choose to become a common equity company as they will face a lower litigation risk) as well as influence them in their decision to carry D&O insurance or not.
To control for this potential endogeneity issue, we instrumentalized ITCE in the selection regressions. As an instrument for ITCE we used three variables: Age, Dummy_hard and Float.
The Age variable is calculated as the number of years since the start of operations of the underlying business. Huson and Pazzaglia (2007) show that Age is strongly correlated with the organizational form decision as older firms are best suited for the income trust structure.
Moreover, Age is not strongly correlated with the decision to purchase D&O insurance. We also included Dummy_hard, which coincides with the high relative valuation wave of income trusts (see Figure 4) , as well as Float as both variables are highly correlated with ITCE but not with Purchase (see correlation matrix in Appendix A).
We therefore ran probit model specification 3 from Table III 
Conclusion
The primary objective of this paper was to demonstrate that insurers penalize the more opaque governance of income trusts. We have documented a strong relationship between the organizational structure opted for by a firm at its IPO and the premium insurers charge to protect its directors and officers against lawsuits. Our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to various model specifications. Several papers, such as Baker and Griffith (2007) , have argued that premiums charged by D&O insurers is based on business and governance risk factors and that deep governance is particularly crucial.
Investors unfortunately cannot observe this deep governance; they cannot even observe, in the United States, the evaluation that D&O insurers make of such deep governance issues (see Griffith, 2006) .
Corporate governance and its impact on the risk and return of corporations have been increasingly under the scrutiny of investors. Many governance indices have emerged in order to fulfil the need for governance risk assessment, but these indices are themselves criticized by academics and practitioners. As underlined in Rose (2007) and Bhagat et al. (2007) , governance indices suffer from many different methodological shortcomings (see , for a recent survey of governance indices). One of these shortcomings, highlighted in Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) , is that governance indices follow a "one size fits all" approach thereby failing to take into account an array of idiosyncratic issues. Moreover, governance indices rely a lot on public information and are often issued by firms that are not always free of conflicts of interest.
One final problem with ad hoc governance indices is that firms under the scrutiny of the rating entity can artificially manipulate these ratings. This should be reminiscent of the credit default swaps debacle. A growing voice in financial markets strongly urges for accountability from entities emitting ratings that are widely used by major market players, which would alleviate the instability emerging from the development of financial products or companies purposively structured so as to barely fit a particular rating. In a recent article, Bebchuk and Hamdani (2009) suggest taking this research one step further by prescribing that one should use different methodologies to measure the quality of corporate governance in firms with and without a controlling shareholder.
An alternative to governance indices that could help investor assess the governance risk of a corporation -or any organisation for that matter -lies in the fact that the vast majority of those corporations are indirectly purchasing themselves a governance assessment when they purchase liability insurance on behalf of their directors and officers. Having D&O liability insurance allows a firm (and in particular its directors and officers) to put the onus of the cost of the liability risk on the shoulders of the insurance company. And because lawsuits against corporate directors for having breached one of their duties toward the firm (fiduciary, care or loyalty) can be very expensive, insurance companies have a monetary incentive to assess correctly the governance risk they seek to insure. As a result, and in opposition to other governance indices, insurers have a very primal incentive to measure and control governance and litigation risk as mentioned by Core (2000) and Baker and Griffith (2007) .
Another advantage of using D&O insurance over governance indices to assess corporate governance risk is that the D&O insurance market is competitive so that insurers must use ever more complex and precise measurement tools to profit from selling such a protection to corporations and their directors. As a result, D&O insurers do not follow a one-size-fits-all approach typical of governance indices. Instead insurers use their expertise to review specific risk factors that may be unavailable to other parties since they have access to unique private information about the firms' directors and officers. This access allows insurers to further their understanding of the specificities of the governance risk of each prospective insured.
This paper contributes to strengthen the viability of such an alternative by using a natural experiment particular to the Canadian economy, that is, the choice that a corporation has at the time of its initial public offering of incorporating itself as an income trust or as a more traditional common equity firm. Because they have an inherently more complex governance structure, income trusts provide researchers with a unique opportunity to test whether insurers price this additional corporate governance risk in the D&O liability insurance protection they provide to organizations and their corporate directors and officers. In accordance with our main hypothesis, we find that insurers do indeed consider income trusts as riskier since the premium income trusts need to pay is significantly greater than the premium that common equity firms need to pay, even after controlling for a multitude of other factors.
Where does that leave us in terms of the use by the market of the D&O insurance information contained in the management proxy and information circular of Canadian firms?
The most important message we should take from the research results we present in this paper is that investors should value the simple information we find in the management proxies about D&O insurance purchases of Canadian corporations. This D&O insurance information should be regarded as a credible alternative to commercial governance indices as it is available to all investors at no cost and comes from entities (i.e. the insurers) with a direct financial incentive to assess correctly the governance risk of a corporation, thereby resolving many critics addressed to governance rating agencies.
Our result regarding the value to investors of the D&O insurance coverage information also raises an interesting question when we look at the D&O insurance information that is publicly available in the United States. Given that a company's basic D&O insurance information is currently not available to the public in the United States, the results of our 31 paper provide a rationale for studying whether such information should be made available.
The current argument against making that information public is that if trial lawyers know what the policy limit is for a given D&O insurance contract, then such a limit would act as a natural focal point for any and all class action lawsuit that lawyers may bring upon a corporation and its management team. But even if this is the case, such an argument is not valid if we look at the rate-on-line variable, which provides information to investors about a firm's litigation risk without acting as a beacon for lawsuits. Of course, more work needs to be done on larger datasets and datasets related to operations in the United States before a more definite conclusion can be drawn. 1 000 000 1 500 000 2 000 000 2 500 000 3 000 000 0 50 000 000 100 000 000 150 000 000 200 000 000 250 000 000 300 000 000 1 000 000 1 500 000 2 000 000 2 500 000 3 000 000 0 50 000 000 100 000 000 150 000 000 200 000 000 250 000 000 300 000 000 400 000 500 000 600 000 700 000 800 000 0 5 000 000 10 000 000 15 000 000 20 000 000 25 000 000 30 000 000 35 000 000 40 000 000 45 000 000 50 000 000 Debt_ratio is computed as total debt over total asset. Ln_MVE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Growth is the market value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. Board_indep is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Board_size is the number of directors on the board. Blockholder is an indicator variable for the presence of an investor owning 10% or more of the outstanding shares or units. Duality takes on the value one if the CEO of the company is also the chairman of the board. Purchase is an indicator variable with value one if the firm purchased D&O insurance at the beginning of its first fiscal year as a public company. Premium and Coverage/1000$ are respectively the premium paid and the limit in thousands of dollars purchased for D&O insurance as reported in the firm's first proxy statement as a public company.
Premium
Prem_cov is the ratio of premium over coverage, which is also refered to as the rate-on-line, multiplied by 1000. Ln_premium ln_cov/1000$ and ln_prem_cov are the natural logarithm of these variables. Float is computed as the ratio of the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. Pct_US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US. Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the company operates in one of the industries classified as risky in Bajaj et al. (2000) .
First_year_XS_Return is the company's one year buy-and-hold return after its IPO completion, minus the return of the S&P/TSX index for the same period. First_Day_Return is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on the close of the first trading day. Volatility is the annualized daily volatility over the one year period following the IPO. Age is the number of years separating inception from the announcement of the IPO. Table III . Marginal impact on the decision to purchase D&O insurance. We evaluate the marginal impact of some variables on the likelihood to carry D&O insurance. The dependent variable is Purchase, an indicator variable equal to one if the firm purchased D&O insurance. We report the marginal effects of variables in our probit models for ease of interpretation of the estimated coefficients. ITCE is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is an income trust. Growth is the market value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. Ln_MVE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Debt_ratio is computed as total debt over total asset. ROA is the return on assets. Duality takes on the value one if the CEO of the company is also the chairman of the board. Board_size is the number of directors on the board. Blockholder is an indicator variable for the presence of an investor owning 10% or more of the outstanding shares or units. Board_indep is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the company operates in one of the industries classified as risky in Bajaj et al. (2000) . Pct_US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US. Volatility is the annualized daily volatility over the one year period following the IPO. Age is the number of years separating inception from the announcement of the IPO. Model (1) presents the impact of some financial variables. Model (2) includes governance variables only while model (3) includes financial and governance variables. Models (4) and (5) add some other variables which we believe might have an impact on the decision to purchase insurance. Coefficients are reported with their p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(1) Table IV . Second stage of the Heckman selection model of the log of the ratio premium/coverage. We evaluate the impact of our variable of interest ITCE on the price of coverage and include several variables as controls. The dependent variable is ln_prem_cov , the natural logarithm of the ratio of premium over coverage. ITCE is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is an income trust. We hypothesize that due to its inherently more complex governance structure, an income trust will be required to pay a higher premium for coverage. Dummy_hard is an indicator variable to account for the hard insurance market years. First_year_XS_Return is the company's one year buy-and-hold return after its IPO completion, minus of the return of the S&P/TSX index for the same period. First_Day_Return is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on the close of the first trading day. Board_indep is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Growth is the market value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. Ln_MVE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Debt_ratio is computed as total debt over total asset. ROA is the return on assets. Age is the number of years separating inception from the announcement of the IPO. Volatility is the annualized daily volatility over the one year period following the IPO. Float is computed as the ratio of the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the company operated in one of the industries classified as risky in Bajaj et al. (2000) . Pct_US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US. IMR is the Inverse Mills' Ratio from the first stage probit regression. The first stage is the probit model specification 3 from Table III . Coefficients are reported with their p-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Table V . OLS regression correcting for endogeneity between the ITCE and the Purchase decisions. We evaluate the impact of our variable of interest ITCE on the price of coverage and include several variables as controls. The dependent variable is ln_prem_cov , the natural logarithm of the ratio of premium over coverage. ITCE is an indicator variable equal to one if the company is an income trust. We hypothesize that due to its inherently more complex governance structure, an income trust will be required to pay a higher premium for coverage. Dummy_hard is an indicator variable to account for the hard insurance market years. First_year_XS_Return is the company's one year buy-and-hold return after its IPO completion, minus of the return of the S&P/TSX index for the same period. First_Day_Return is our control variable for underpricing and is computed as the first day return on the close of the first trading day. Board_indep is the percentage of independent directors on the board. Growth is the market value of equity plus the book value of liability, divided by the book value of assets. Ln_MVE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. Debt_ratio is computed as total debt over total asset. ROA is the return on assets. Age is the number of years separating inception from the announcement of the IPO. Volatility is the annualized daily volatility over the one year period following the IPO. Float is computed as the ratio of the number of shares issued over the total number of shares outstanding. Risky_Industry is an indicator variable equal to one if the company operated in one of the industries classified as risky in Bajaj et al. (2000) . Pct_US_Sales is the percentage of sales carried out in the US. As an endogeneity problem between the ITCE and the Purchase decisions could arise, we instrumentalized ITCE in the first stage probit regression. IMR is the Inverse Mills' Ratio generated using equation (1) 
